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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the role of independent validation 
in the development of software systems. As software systems 
become increasingly larger and more complex the role of 
software validation becomes crucial. In particular, one must 
make sure that the specification of a software system is 
correct with respect to customer expectations. We introduce 
an approach for developing and validating reuse libraries of 
temporal formal specifications. These libraries include UML 
statechart based assertions for formal specifications and 
their associated validation test scenarios. We build the 
validation test scenarios with the goal of ensuring that 
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Software is essential to almost every facet of our 
daily lives from business to science, and while the 
advantages are numerous and have arguably bettered our 
lives, it comes with a cost.  The National Institute of 
Standard and Technology (NIST) sponsored a study in 2001 and 
found that the annual cost of software errors to the U.S. 
Economy in 2001 was approximately $59.5 billion.1 
Additionally the study found that over half the costs have 
been borne by the users. This is remarkable because software 
practitioners have not yet been held accountable to the same 
standards imposed on engineers in traditional engineering 
disciplines.  
Over the years, some software defects have resulted in 
human injuries, property damage, and in extreme cases, loss 
of human lives. This is a cost that is unacceptable to users 
and must not be accepted by software developers. One of the 
most well known examples of software error causing human 
fatalities is the THERAC 252. This machine was supposed to 
save human lives by sending the proper amount of radiation 
into patients, but instead it overdosed humans with massive 
                     
1
 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Software 
errors cost U.S. economy $59.5 billion annually.” National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST2002-10) (2002), 
http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/n02-10.htm (accessed May 10, 
2008). 
2
 N. Levenson and C. Turner, “Investigation of the Therac 25 
accidents.” IEEE Computer (July 1993), 18-41.  
 2 
amounts of radiation and resulted in several fatalities.3 
These failures are not just unacceptable but could have been 
avoided had the software been validated and verified 
properly. The IEEE standards, for validation and 
verification, help to guide the software developers with two 
main questions, “am I building the right product?” and “am I 
building the product right?” These questions are 
longstanding and will, if answered appropriately, help 
reduce the risk of mishaps due to software defects. 
Another challenge the software industry faces is that 
software is increasing in complexity, making it difficult to 
detect errors and eliminate them. This also increases the 
importance of validation and testing methods that enable 
earlier and more effective error identification and removal. 
Software must be verified and validated to ensure not just 
quality and safety but also guard against waste, in terms of 
money and lives. 
Our motivation for the research reported here is to 
develop techniques that improve the engineer’s ability to 
validate software systems. Additionally, these validation 
techniques will be applicable to the entire software 
industry and when used in conjunction with verification will 
hopefully result in better software systems and reduce 
software defects and their attendant costs. 
 
                     
3
 R. Merritt, “Embedded experts: fix code bugs or cost lives.” 
Information Week (April 10, 2006), http://www.informationweek.com/news/ 
management/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=185300011 (accessed May 05, 
2008). 
 3 
B. INDEPENDENT VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION 
The current guideline for validation and verification 
is the IEEE standard 1012-20044 which has had to evolve 
because of decades of unsuccessful software. The overall aim 
is to establish guidelines for the software industry to 
follow and help to create better software products.  
The following is directly quoted from the IEEE standard 
1012-20045:  
Software V&V processes consists of the following: 
• Verification process and validation process. The 
verification process provides objective evidence 
whether the software and its associated products and 
processes conform to requirements (e.g., for 
correctness, completeness, consistency, accuracy) for 
all life cycle activities during each life cycle 
process acquisition, supply, development, operation, 
and maintenance)satisfy standards, practices, and 
conventions during life cycle processes. 
• Successfully complete each life cycle activity and 
satisfy all the criteria for initiating succeeding life 
cycle activities (e.g., building the software 
correctly). 
• The validation process provides evidence whether the 
software and its associated products and processes 
satisfy system requirements allocated to software at 
the end of each life cycle activity. 
• Solve the right problem (e.g., correctly model physical 
laws, implement business rules, use the proper system 
assumptions). 
• Satisfy intended use and user needs. 
                     
4 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Standard for 
Software Verification and Validation,IEEE-STD-1012, June 08, 2005. 
5 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Standard for 
Software Verification and Validation,IEEE-STD-1012, June 08, 2005. 
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The verification process and the validation process are 
interrelated and complementary processes that use each 
other’s process results to establish better completion 
criteria and analysis, evaluation, review, inspection, 
assessment, and test V&V tasks for each software life cycle 
activity. 
The IEEE guidelines leave the software industry to 
develop their own validation and verification methods. The 
industry has yet to integrate these techniques fully, 
contributing to the poor record of software acquisition. In 
fact, the Standish Group reported that the success rate of 
software projects was 35% in 2006, and the report claimed 
that software developers fielded only 46% of the required 
features and functions, which means that the projects did 
not meet the needs of the customer.6  These studies indicate 
conformance to the V&V guidelines are not enough to 
significantly lower the defect rate in software partition of 
systems. The V&V guidelines empower the individual to create 
and implement their own IV&V plan of actions, and the only 
consequence to not following the guidelines is unsuccessful 
acquisition of software. Formal V&V (FV&V) techniques can be 
used to address some of the failings of the existing 
practice of V&V. 
C. THE NEED FOR A STANDARD TECHNIQUE  
The current problem facing the software industry in 
facilitating validation is that there are no concise, simple 
techniques to conduct validation. The IEEE IV&V guidelines 
are general and meant to guide the industry in the actual 
                     
6
 The Standish Group International, "Annual Chaos Report." (2006). 
 5 
implementation of validation. This leaves the software 
industry to its own devices on the implementation of 
validation and can result, in the worst case scenario, with 
poor validation processes if validation is conducted at all. 
This is largely due to the ignorance of validation 
procedures and misunderstanding of the necessity of 
validation. And it has resulted in the industry’s primary 
focus on verification because it can be easier to accomplish 
and minimal effort is put into validation. Thus much effort 
is in “have we built the system right?” but not “have we 
built the right system?” 
Adding to the problem, there is no general consensus 
among the academic community on how to complete the 
validation phase, many different paths are used. The typical 
way for a system to be built, if there is structure at all, 
is for the software requirements to be gathered, using pen 
and paper, use cases built and then code is written directly 
from the use cases. There is no formal link from the 
requirements to the formal specification of the system 
behaviors (if one exists) to ensure that the correct system 
is being built. The formal specification of system behaviors 
includes assertions which precisely model the required 
behavior of the system and can be traceable to the system 
requirements providing a means to ensure that the correct 
system is being built.  As examples, both Voyager and 
Galileo had significant software errors; the primary cause 
of the faults were directly related to system behaviors that 
had not been identified or developed by the developers. One 




specifying the required behaviors in terms of assertions and 
validating the correctness of these assertions against 
stakeholder expectations before building the software. 
One way to facilitate the validation process is through 
execution-based validation. Execution-based validation is 
the process of inferring certain behavioral properties to 
exercise the system under test (SUT) in a known environment 
and with selected inputs. This gives the person conducting 
validation the capability to validate that the system being 
built is the correct system based on user requirements. In 
our thesis we use the StateRover white-box automatic test-
generator. The white-box test generator constructs a JUnit 
TestCase class from a given statechart assertion model and 
the associate embedded assertions. The advantages of this 
process include: the ability to pinpoint specific errors; 
investigate the causes of failures on a specific input in 
detail; and eliminate errors in their design in an efficient 
manner.  
D. THE ROLE OF SOFTWARE REUSE 
Software reuse is an important concept that can help 
clarify validation techniques, making them more relevant for 
software development teams. Software reuse aims to increase 
the productivity, efficiency and quality of software by 
reusing the applicable software from one project in another 
project.7 By reusing the software the developers can save 
resources that would have otherwise been used to develop the 
software.  
                     
7
 W. Lim, Managing software reuse, a comprehensive guide to 
strategically reengineering the organization for reusable components. 
Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall PTR, (1998): 7. 
 7 
An important part of validation is the creation of 
formal specifications in the form of assertion statements to 
capture the correct behavior of the software from natural 
language requirements. Assertion statements can be difficult 
to define and produce because of natural language 
ambiguities. However, with the use of the reuse concepts, 
libraries can be established. These libraries will contain 
correct assertion statements which have been thoroughly 
tested. The assertion development team can then reuse the 
correct assertion statement and use the accompanying test 
suite to ensure that the chosen assertion matches the 
requirements and proper validation is occurring.  
E. OUTLINE 
This work’s main objective is to facilitate the 
assertion validation process. This is accomplished through 
the use of libraries which contain consistent and accurate 
assertions.  We intend to demonstrate that these assertions 
are correct and reusable through the use of testing 
scenarios. These assertions will provide a type of 
engineering control for the IV&V process.  
The organization of the thesis is as follows: 
Chapter II provides background information about IV&V 
and software reuse. The chapter will show a deficiency in 
the current guidance provided for software validation, and 




Chapter III discusses the NASA System Reference Model 
(SRM) and the use of assertions in repository libraries. 
Chapter IV discusses the use of patterns to facilitate 
Software reuse.  




II. IV&V AND SOFTWARE REUSE 
A. COMPLEXITY OF SOFTWARE DESIGN 
Anyone who is associated with software design 
understands that software systems can be extremely complex. 
They are so complex that most software engineering 
researchers often focus their research solely on ways to 
deal with complexity. The reason these systems are so 
complicated can often be traced back to the users’ 
requirements for that system. A system that is required to 
perform several functions will naturally be more complex 
than a system that is required to perform just one function. 
Common problems that occur when developing software include 
failing to match the final product to the customers’ needs, 
or dealing with errors in the software that often reveal 
themselves at the worst possible time and are often costly 
to fix. One way to try to avoid these problems is to 
implement Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) and 
software reuse into the development of the systems. This 
chapter covers IV&V, how IV&V is conducted, and how software 
engineers are currently leveraging software reuse in 
building software systems.  
B. DEFINITIONS 
Independent: Independence in relation to IV&V is 
defined by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE) using three parameters: technical 
independence, managerial independence, and financial 
independence.  
 10 
Technical Independence: “requires the V&V effort to 
utilize personnel who are not involved in the development of 
the software.”8 
Managerial Independence: “requires that the 
responsibility for the IV&V effort be vested in an 
organization separate from the development and program 
management organizations.”9 
Financial Independence: “requires that control of the 
IV&V budget be vested in an organization independent of the 
development organization.”10 
Verification: “The process of evaluating a system or 
component to determine whether the products of a given 
deployment phase satisfy the conditions imposed at the start 
of that phase.” 11 Software verification answers the 
question, “Are we building the product right?” 
Validation: “The process of evaluating a system or 
component during or at the end of the development process to 
determine whether it satisfies specified requirements.” 
12Software validation answers the question “Are we building 
the right product?”  
 
 
                     
8
 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Standard for 










Software IV&V: “a series of technical and management 
activities performed by someone other than the developer of 
a system to improve the quality and reliability of that 
system and to assure that the delivered product satisfies 
the user’s operational needs.”13 
Software Reuse: “the use of existing software artifacts 
in the development of other software artifacts with the goal 
of improving productivity and quality, among other 
factors.”14       
Requirement Specification: “an organization's 
understanding (in writing) of a customer or potential 
client's system requirements and dependencies at a 
particular point in time (usually) prior to any actual 
design or development work.”15  
Pattern: “a body of literature to help software 
developers resolve recurring problems encountered throughout 
all of software development.”16 
C. IV&V BACKGROUND 
In the early 1940s the first computer was developed to 
calculate artillery firing tables for the United States 
                     
13
 R. Lewis, Independent verification & validation: A life cycle 
engineering process for quality software. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
(1992): xxiii. 
14
 W. Lim, Managing software reuse, a comprehensive guide to 
strategically reengineering the organization for reusable components. 
Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall PTR, (1998): 7. 
15
 D. Le Vie, “Writing software requirements specifications” TECHWR-L 
(MAR 2007) http://www.techwrl.com/techwhirl/magazine/writing/ 
softwarerequirementspecs.htm (accessed July 15, 2008). 
16
 B. Appleton, "Patterns and software: essential concepts and 
terminology” CM Crossroads (2000), http://www.cmcrossroads.com/ 
bradapp/docs/patterns-intro.html (accessed September 20, 2008). 
 12 
Army's Ballistic Research Laboratory. The design of the 
computer was focused primarily on hardware, not paying much 
attention to software. In fact, some would say in the early 
stages of computing, software was often ignored. The 
intention of computers at this time was to perform a single 
task. When the task was identified the computers were hard-
wired to accomplish that task. With the role of software 
being so small the need for IV&V had not yet been 
recognized. However, as time passed and the role and cost of 
software grew, the need for IV&V became evident.   
In the mid 1940s John Von Neumann came up with two 
concepts that would have a direct impact on software design. 
The first was known as “shared program technique.” “This 
technique states that the actual computer hardware should be 
simple and not need to be hand-wired for each program. 
Rather, complex instructions should be used to control the 
simple hardware, allowing it to be reprogrammed much 
faster.”17 
The second concept he developed was called “conditional 
control transfer.” “This idea gave rise to the notion of 
subroutines, or small blocks of code that could be jumped to 
in any order, instead of a single set of chronologically 
ordered steps for the computer to read. The second part of 
the idea stated that computer code should be able to branch 
out based on logical statements such as “IF” (expression) 
“THEN,” and looped with others such as a “FOR”  
                     
17 C. Robat, “Introduction to software history.” The History of 
Computing Project (October 17, 2006), http://www.thocp.net 
/software/software_reference/introduction_to_software_history.htm 
(accessed June 11, 2008). 
 13 
statement.”18 The use of these concepts, and others like 
them, allowed software to grow into a more significant part 
of computer design.   
As software grew, so did the cost associated with it. 
In the 1950s, software’s cost was only 20% of the overall 
system cost. In the 1980’s, software costs rose to 80%.  
Today, software costs can be up to 95% of the overall system 
cost.19 These rising costs forced software developers to 
find a way to save money. 
In the late 1950s, one of the leading software 
developers was the Department of Defense (DoD). The DoD 
began to notice projects were consistently behind schedule, 
over budget, and did not provide the required performance. 
This was unacceptable not only for financial reasons but 
because software errors can lead to loss of life, injury, or 
loss of property especially in military systems. The DoD was 
repeatedly surprised by the costly projects because 
“...software development contractors often gave overly 
optimistic assessments of the software development status to 
the DoD.”20 To address this, the DoD launched a plan to 
conduct IV&V on their software systems in an attempt to get 
accurate assessments of how their projects were doing. The 
 
                     
18
 C. Robat, “Introduction to software history.” The History of 
Computing Project (October 17, 2006), http://www.thocp.net 
/software/software_reference/introduction_to_software_history.htm 
(accessed June 11, 2008). 
19
 S. Reiss, A practical introduction to software design with C++. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1998, 397-421. 
20
 S. Rakin, “Food for thought: What is software quality assurance?” 
Software Quality Consulting (Jan. 2005, Vol.2 No.1), 
http://www.swqual.com/newsletter/vol2/no1/vol2no1.html (accessed June 
01, 2008). 
 14 
first program to use IV&V was the Atlas Missile Program in 
the late 1950s. An independent software tester was hired to 
conduct unbiased testing of the software. 21 
Over time, the role of IV&V continued to develop and in 
the 1970’s “... the U.S. Army sponsored the first 
significant such IV&V program for the Safeguard Anti-
Ballistic Missile System.”22 The program was designed to 
identify and eliminate the high risks that are common with 
military systems. It was successful in meeting its goal and 
“By the mid- to late 1970’s, IV&V was rapidly becoming 
popular and in some cases was required by the military 
services...”23 “It was from this effort that IV&V became 
well known within the Department of Defense and the 
aerospace communities as an accepted method of ensuring 
better quality, performance, and reliability of critical 
systems.”24 
In the decades following the seventies, IV&V became an 
intricate part of the software development process. A 
process that started as “...mostly free-form, not very 
independent, often started too late to be really effective, 
and was sometimes even performed by the very people who were 
developing the system...”25 grew into process where “...a 
                     
21
 S. Rakin, “Food for thought: What is software quality assurance?” 
Software Quality Consulting (Jan. 2005, Vol.2 No.1), 
http://www.swqual.com/newsletter/vol2/no1/vol2no1.html (accessed June 
01, 2008). 
22
 R. Lewis, Independent verification & validation: A life cycle 







 R. Lewis, Independent verification & validation: A life cycle 
engineering process for quality software. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
(1992): xxiii. 
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completely independent entity evaluates the work products 
generated by the team that is designing and/or executing a 
given project...”26 The independent entity will also 
“...monitor and evaluate every aspect of the project itself 
from inception to completion.”27  
While the cost of conducting IV&V is high, the money 
saved by preventing errors and rework is far greater. In 
1993, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) established an IV&V facility in the wake of the Space 
Shuttle Challenger accident. The facility was developed as 
part of a plan “to provide the highest achievable levels of 
safety and cost-effectiveness for mission critical 
software.”28 “In 2006, NASA allocated $27 Million to the 
IV&V Facility Budget, of which $19 Million went directly to 
IV&V Services.”29 After conducting a Return on Investment 
analysis, “NASA realized a software rework risk reduction 
benefit of $1.6 Billion in Fiscal Year 2006 alone.”30 From 
the facilities inception at NASA, it has experienced 
continued growth while providing better software/system 
performance, higher confidence in the software reliability, 
and a reduced maintenance cost. 
                     
26
 C. Nickolett, “Project due diligence: independent verification and 
validation.” White Paper.Comprehensive Consulting Solutions. Mar 2001: 





 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), "NASA IV&V 
facility - about IV&V." National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), http://www.nasa.gov/centers/ivv/ about/index.html (accessed June 
01, 2008). 
29
 NASA IV&V Facility, “NASA IV&V 2006 annual report.” NASA IV&V 
Facility, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/ivv/pdf/ 




When performed correctly IV&V can be a crucial part of 
the software development process. The process begins with 
developing Software Integrity Levels (SILs) which “are a 
range of values that represent software complexity, 
criticality, risk, safety level, security level, desired 
performance, reliability, or other project-unique 
characteristics that define the importance of the software 
to the user and acquirer.”31 SILs are then used to determine 
which V&V tasks to perform. The higher the software 
integrity level, the more V&V tasks assigned. SILs are not 
constant and can change as software evolves to ensure the 
appropriate V&V tasks are being performed. Below is an 
example of SILs based upon the concepts of consequences and 
mitigation potential as well as an example of V&V processes, 
activities, and tasks from the IEEE Standard for 
Verification and Validation. These examples are provided as 
guidance on how software developers can incorporate IV&V 
into their software design to assist in reducing 
specification errors. 
                     
31
 Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Standard for 
Software Verification and Validation,IEEE-STD-1012, June 08, 2005. 
 17 
Description of Software integrity Level      Level 
Software element must execute correctly or grave consequences (loss of life, loss of 
system, economic or social loss) will occur. No mitigation is possible. 4 
 
Software element must execute correctly or the intended use (mission) of the system/ 
software will not be realized, causing serious consequences (permanent injury, major 
system degradation, economic or social impact). Partial to complete mitigation is possible. 3 
 
Software element must execute correctly or an intended function will not be realized, 
causing minor consequences. Complete mitigation possible. 2 
 
Software element must execute correctly or intended function will not be realized, 
causing negligible consequences. Mitigation not required. 1 
 




Figure 2.   V&V processes, activities, and tasks. 
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D. CURRENT GUIDANCE FOR VALIDATION 
Incorporating IV&V into software design is essential to 
reducing specification errors. What software engineers need 
to ensure is when IV&V is applied it is done so correctly. 
The definitions for V&V provided at the beginning of this 
chapter allow for the use of computer-based V&V tools to 
check the correctness of a system or a specific component 
against a formal specification derived from the natural 
language requirements. The specifications are created and 
the final product is then built to satisfy those 
specifications. Validation that is being conducted in 
accordance with the guidelines provided by the IEEE 
evaluates specific components or the final product with the 
specifications. This process is in fact verification. The 
product is being built correctly according to the 
specifications, however, it is not known if the 
specifications themselves are correct. It is imperative that 
validation be conducted on the specifications that are 
created to ensure that the requirements for the project are 
understood and that the correct product is built.   
E. SOFTWARE REUSE 
Software reuse is a practice that began in the 1950s 
with the goal of improving software development productivity 
and quality. For the past twenty years a great deal of 
research has been focused on software reuse and its role in 
software design. Areas that have been given attention 
include but are not limited to reuse libraries, design 
patterns, and reuse using formal specifications of 
requirements. While software reuse holds promise of 
 20 
improving software development productivity and software 
quality, the success of reuse is based on the quality of the 
reusable artifacts. The reuse of software that has not been 
verified and validated contradicts the intended goal of 
producing quality software because errors in the software 
may still exist. This reasoning also holds true when 
discussing the use of formal requirements specifications. 
The use of formal requirements specifications is essential 
in the automation of the software verification process. 
However, we assert that the correctness of these formal 
specifications must be first validated before they can be 
used to verify correctness of the software.  
Formal specification has been an active area of 
research for more than two decades. The requirements 
specification of a software component describes the expected 
functions and behavior of the software. The ability to reuse 
the software component becomes evident if its structure and 
behavior are compatible with new software being designed.  
Verification has been another popular research topic 
for over 20 years. Automated finite state verification tools 
have been developed to assist software developers in 
verifying system specifications. The users of these tools 
must be capable of specifying the requirements of the system 
they are developing in the specification language the tool 
understands. Behavior for a software component is typically 
specified using temporal logic in an attempt to avoid the 
ambiguity derived from natural language. 
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F. FORMAL SPECIFICATION PATTERNS 
To assist developers in specifying the behavior in a 
temporal logic, Dwyer suggests the use of property 
specification patterns. “A property specification pattern is 
a generalized description of a commonly occurring 
requirement on the permissible state/event sequences in a 
finite state model of a system.”32 These patterns describe 
the essential behavior of a system and provide expressions 
of this behavior in a range of common temporal logics to be 
used with verification tools. The patterns are then given 
distinct names describing their behavior which allows them 
to be mapped to examples of known use, to relationships to 
other patterns, and to specific formalisms. To facilitate 
verification, Dwyer proposes the development of a system of 
property specific patterns for finite state verification 
tools. The system is a set of patterns or library organized 
into one or more hierarchies, with connections between 
related patterns to facilitate the browsing of the system. 
“A user would search for the appropriate pattern to match 
the requirement being specified, use the mapping section to 
obtain the essential structure of the pattern in the 
formalism used by a particular (verification) tool, and then 
instantiate that pattern by plugging in the state formula or 
events specific to the requirement.”33 The use of these 
patterns allows for the specification of critical properties 
 
 
                     
32
 M. Dwyer, G. Avrunin, et.al. “Patterns in property specifications 
for finite-state verification.” Proceedings of the 21st international 




that exist in software systems and guides users of 
verification tools to express these properties in a 
specification language.  
In 2005, Konrad and Cheng went a step further with 
specification patterns and introduced real-time 
specification patterns that can be used to specify real-time 
properties for embedded systems. Similar to Dwyer’s 
specification patterns, the real-time specification patterns 
contain templates for specifying real-time properties in 
terms of real-time temporal logic.34 This pattern system is 
intended to provide strategies for specifying real-time 
properties in a formal specification language, where the 
properties are amenable to automated analysis such as 
verification tools.35 
Specification patterns and the use of libraries to 
store those patterns provide another form of software reuse. 
This form of reuse aims at reducing the cost and improving 
the quality of formal specification development. However, 
the effectiveness of the specification pattern reuse depends 
on the correctness and consistency of the resultant 
requirements. Proper validation needs to be performed in 
order to confirm that the requirements are understood.  
Otani et al. explains a concept of developing and 
validating libraries of temporal formal specifications. 
These libraries would include UML Statechart based 
assertions for formal specifications and their associated 
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validation test scenarios.36 We intend to build the 
validation test scenarios with the goal of ensuring that 
specifications within the libraries are indeed error-free 
and consistent. The following chapter describes the NASA 
System Reference Model (SRM) and its role in capturing a 
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III. SYSTEM REFERENCE MODEL 
A. BACKGROUND 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) has continuously developed their IV&V program, 
supporting new technologies and better validation and 
verification techniques in an effort to improve the 
validation and verification process. Earlier versions of the 
V&V process included the Criticality and Risk Assessment 
(CARA) and the Software Integrity Level Assessment Process 
(SILAP). Both processes were found lacking because they 
relied on manual examination and independent testing of 
target code. These techniques are ineffective for use in 
validation because there are no links from the requirements 
to the system’s features, capabilities, properties and 
functions. Without formal specifications of the system 
behaviors both CARA and SILAP were unable to validate the 
correctness and completeness of the developer’s 
understanding of the requirements. Finally, the processes 
were unable to locate the subtle errors in increasingly 
complex software-intensive system. Both CARA and SILAP 
evaluated the risk of software components in a system by 
compiling a list of software components and evaluating them 
to prioritize risk assessment, which cannot show that the 
system being built is the correct system. NASA is in the 
process of replacing SILAP with advanced computer-aided 
validation techniques. 
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The NASA IV&V Facility recognized a need for validation 
to be more than a risk assessment; it needed to provide a 
model for the system to show37:  
• What the system is supposed to do.  
• What the system is not supposed to do and  
• How the system should respond under adverse conditions. 
The NASA IV&V Facility now relies on the use of a 
System Reference Model (SRM) for each product. “The SRM 
provides the basis for validating the completeness and 
correctness of the targeted requirements set.”38 Once the 
targeted requirements are developed the independent 
validation team is able to validate those requirements. The 
SRM supports a computer-aided validation technique through 
which the independent validation team’s understanding and 
perception of the problem is validated through the team’s 
representation of the SRM’s features, properties, function, 
and capabilities. It is also during this time that the 
development team is able to discover and correct any 
identified problems or concerns with their understanding of 
the requirements for the intended system. This is important 
because the model holds the responsibility to be complete 
and accurate to serve its intended purpose and the 
development team holds the responsibility to ensure that the 
model fulfills that purpose. 
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The following definitions are described in the SRM 
guideline39. The definition of dependability will be 
customized to the user’s needs and wants of the system. 
• Dependability: A dependable system is one that provides 
the appropriate levels of correctness and robustness in 
accomplishing its mission while demonstrating the 
appropriate levels of availability, consistency, 
reliability, safety, and recoverability. 
• Availability: The probability that a system is 
operating correctly and is ready to perform its desired 
functions. 
• Consistency: The property that invariants will always 
hold true in the system. 
• Correctness: A characteristic of a system that 
precisely exhibits predictable behavior at all times as 
defined by the system specifications. 
• Reliability: The property that a system can operate 
continuously without experiencing a failure. 
• Robustness: A characteristic of a system that is 
failure and fault tolerant. 
• Safety: The property of avoiding a catastrophic outcome 
given a system fails to operate correctly. 
• Recoverability: The ease for which a failed system can 
be restored to operational use. 
C. SYSTEM REFERENCE MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Without a doubt, any process can become overwhelming in 
both cost and time. Thus, it is necessary for the SRM to 
have an appropriate level of specificity so that a 
completion point can be reached. “The appropriate level of 
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V&V is a function of the time available to do the V&V 
evaluations, and this should in turn be a function of the 
risk that will be incurred if the V&V is not done, or the 
risk that will be mitigated if a given level of V&V is 
done.”40 The SRM still must be developed to a level of 
fidelity to support validation of the system and result in 
completeness and correctness of the targeted requirements. 
The SRM can be extremely detailed and can consist of 
high-level use cases, Unified Modeling Language (UML) 
artifacts such as activity diagrams, sequence diagrams and 
object class diagrams, and a set of formal assertions to 
describe precisely the necessary behaviors to satisfy system 
goals, with respect to the three questions stated 
previously. These many artifacts allow the team to properly 
express the requirements through the SRM and ensure that 
their understanding of the requirements is correct.  
The development of the SRM begins with a scoping 
period. During this time the SRM development team commences 
with a front-end analysis. The front-end analysis ensures 
that the team has a clear perspective of the intended use of 
the model. This high-level abstraction helps the team ensure 
that the model is defined which in-turn drives the 
objectives of the model development. The scoping period also 
ensures that the SRM development is based on concept-level 
documentation rather than requirements generated by the 
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system developers. Finally, the scoping period should 
finalize the level of specificity of the requirements so 
that a completion point can be reached. 
The scoping period consists of analyzing the 
constraints, restrictions and targeted tasks and 
requirements to recognize the depth of the modeling needed.  
Additionally, requirements that will not be modeled in the 
SRM are identified and the team ensures that sufficient 
concept documentation is available to continue. The concept 
documents used during the process are found in many forms of 
stakeholder inputs from mission statements to concepts of 
operations. The scoping period ends with a clear 
understanding of the system elements that need to be 
addressed and the depth that they need to be defined. The 
level of fidelity should be determined at this point to 
ensure completeness and correctness of the targeted system 
requirements.  
The next stages of the SRM development are accomplished 
through the development of use cases and UML artifacts as 
well as supporting assertions. The SRM team, using the 
conceptual documents, will begin by documenting system 
behaviors. It is during this time that the system goals 
should be identified and a traceability matrix developed, 
populated with these top-level goals. Additionally, the 
operational environment must be identified and the 
traceability matrix should be populated with operation 
environment characteristics that need to be addressed by the 
system model. The top-level use cases developed to address 
the overall system goals are peer reviewed to validate that 
the preliminary use case set spans the high-level 
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description of the system and is documented in the 
traceability matrix. The top-level use cases are abstracted 
from the details of the system and are goal-oriented. These 
use cases help the developers to get a clear understanding 
of the process and problems to be solved as well as the 
goals and objectives of the system. The top-level use cases 
then are refined into lower-level use cases and activity 
diagrams which can be mapped to sequence diagrams. The 
process continues to become more specific to ensure that the 
goals and objectives are accomplished but also to verify 
that their constraints are also adequately captured. The 
diagrams should provide a complete representation of the 
behavior expected to be displayed by the system. 
Additionally, all behaviors should be mapped and defined 
into the traceability matrix and peered reviewed to ensure 
correctness. The overall goal is to ensure that the top-
level use cases have been refined into detailed lower-level 
uses cases that represent not only the Main Success Scenario 
(MSS) but are fully elaborated to ensure necessary 
extensions are also represented.  Finally, the modeling team 
has to ensure that any dependability considerations are 
addressed and represented in the model. This entire effort 
should represent the desired system behaviors as well as any 
necessary extensions and assertions that map to the top-
level goals and requirements. The model is ready to be 
validated.  
D. VALIDATING THE SYSTEM REFERENCE MODEL 
The newly developed SRM is a representation created by 
the SRM development team and is a result of the teams own 
perceptions and understanding of the desired system 
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behaviors. As such the representation could be wrong if the 
team misinterpreted the desired behaviors of the system. 
This is why the SRM must be validated to reduce 
specification error as well as to ensure that the behavior 
requirements created by the SRM development team are 
measured against the SRM for correctness. The SRM is a model 
of the intended system and it must meet any dependable 
considerations in order for the intended system to be so as 
well. 
The validation process is twofold and can begin with a 
formal review and tracing of the UML artifacts to include: 
use case definitions and models, supporting assertions, and 
activity diagrams. Other artifacts reviewed include the 
complete set of system-behavior definitions based on 
stakeholder goals and system constraints and operations 
environments defined in the concept documentation. During 
this review the formal tracing of the requirements from the 
top-level to the more refined lower-levels and the activity 
diagrams and sequence diagrams helps to identify the 
subsystems and components responsible for the system 
requirements. Additionally, during this process all the 
requirements are elicited and peer reviewed. This ensures 
that all targeted requirements have been identified and 
traced through the artifacts. During this time all necessary 
objects and events are labeled, identified, and checked to 
ensure there are no unnecessary objects or events. The above 
process ensures that all targeted requirements are fully 
detailed in accordance with their goals. During each review 
each step is subjected to extensive group review to validate 
that the SRM is a complete and unambiguous representation of 
the system.  
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The second step of the validation process is to execute 
as much of the model as possible through computer-aided 
auditing. Run-time verification of formal assertions is able 
to check for inconsistency, omission and errors in the SRM. 
By executing as much of the model as possible it increases 
the evidence that the model being developed is the correct 
system. The independent validation team is able to use the 
evidence of validation to ensure that the SRM is the correct 
system.   
The IV&V team’s requirements elicitation and validation 
tasks produce deliverable packages, consisting of: UML 
models for reference model constituents, natural language 
assertions, formal representation of the assertions, and a 
validation test suite for each assertion.  The test suites 
are detailed and include tests that cover multiple scenarios 
that meet the requirements of the assertions, and will be 
discussed further in the next chapter. These deliverable 
packages are the evidence gathered to decrease specification 
errors and must be done to validate the SRM and provide 
evidence of dependability of the system.  
The SRM is intricate and detailed in order to show its 
dependability. But before dependability can be shown the SRM 
assertions must be validated to decrease specification 
errors. In fact the assertions should precisely model the 
required behavior of the system and if they are able to do 
so the model is on its way to being validated. But 
assertions also have to be validated and are validated 
through an execution-based model checker for dependability 
of the model under test.  
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E. INCREASING THE USABILITY OF THE SRM  
The difficulty with assertions is in their creation. It 
not only takes time and effort, but the correctness of the 
executable assertions depends on the ability of the modelers 
to specify correct assertions. It is difficult to specify 
and develop correct assertions. The modelers must have a 
correct representation of the structure and behavior of the 
SRM, the assertions must also be correct. If faulty 
assertions are used they are not effective in the IV&V 
process. We believe that a library built with correct 
assertions would enable the assertions to be reused. This 
could both decrease the burden on the modelers to develop 
the assertions and improve the ability of the independent 
validation teams to validate the dependability of the 
software.  
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IV. BUILDING AN ASSERTION LIBRARY 
A. BACKGROUND 
As mentioned in the previous chapters the SRM is a 
representation created by the developers as a result of 
their own understanding of the desired system behaviors. The 
SRM must be validated to reduce specification errors. One of 
the ways to do this is through assertions which precisely 
model the required behavior of the system and are the 
foundation of the SRM.  Through testing and modeling 
assertions the independent validation team begins to 
comprehend the problem domain and refine any problems to 
ensure that the SRM meets the user’s requirements and the 
correct system is built. The current way to build assertions 
is to develop the assertions from natural a language 
description of the user’s understanding anew every time; 
this can be a time-consuming and error-prone undertaking. We 
believe that an assertion library can help ease these tasks 
by providing validated assertions which can be reused.  
The purpose of this chapter was to construct an 
approach to building an assertion library with a small 
number of assertions that have been validated for 
correctness and are reusable. We define a library to be a 
collection of assertions that are stored, collectively 
shared and can be filled with more assertions as needed. The 
assertions in the library are validated through the use of 
test scenarios that we designed. The test scenarios are 
patterns which test the assertion for the required behavior.  
The purpose of the test suites is to disambiguate the 
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assertions, and test for correctness meaning that the 
assertions accurately reflect the natural language statement 
as we intended. 
The assertion library would be built so that the 
assertions are reusable and adaptable for future projects. 
Software developers can select from the library any 
assertions that meet their needs and adapt them or use them 
as an example to build their own. In each case we ensured 
that the assertion was general to increase the ability to be 
reused as well as be more relevant to the library. We hope 
that through this process that software developers will be 
able to use our correct assertions in the library for their 
own use and reuse, lessening their burden and reducing 
specification errors in the software. 
B. STATECHART ASSERTIONS 
The libraries are built through the use of “UML 
statechart based temporal assertions for formal 
specifications.”41 The UML statecharts are developed from 
both the research efforts of Harel, who first proposed the 
use of statechart diagrams as a visual approach to modeling 
the behavior of complex reactive system, and Drusinsky who 
both increased and extended the use of statechart diagrams 
to specify formal assertions. Drusinsky was able to extend 
the use of statecharts as formal assertions for temporal 
behavior with “the inclusion of a built-in Boolean flag 
bSuccess and a corresponding isSuccess method which 
specifies the Boolean status of the assertion true if the 
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assertion succeeds and false otherwise.”42 The statechart 
assertion indicates that “formalism is supported by 
StateRover, a design entry, code generation, and visual 
debug animation tool for UML statecharts combined with 
flowcharts.”43 Assertion statecharts can be nondeterministic 
and deterministic depending on the needs and wants of the 
developer and modeler. For example, the developer might want 
a nondetermistic statechart if there are nested requirements 
which can be more difficult to write and less readable in a 
deterministic solution. Or alternatively if the assertion 
needs to be active in runtime, then a deterministic 
statechart might be a better solution because of the 
overhead incurred in the nondeterministic statechart at 
runtime. 
Finally, it is important to understand the proper use 
of a statechart assertion. Remember that the assertion uses 
the “built-in Boolean variable name bSuccess, and a 
corresponding method called isSuccess(), both automatically 
created by the code generator”44 to make a statement about 
the assertion’s correctness.  The default settings of the 
assertion statechart variable bSuccess is set to true. To 
appropriately test success and failure, the modeler needs to 
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ensure that the assertion enters the error state and the on-
entry action assigns bSuccess=false when the assertion 
fails. 
C. ASSERTION VALIDATION 
Once the natural language has been translated into an 
assertion the assertion must then be validated. The 
assumptions in the statechart must be tested to ensure that 
the statechart assertion correctly represents the intended 
behavior the modeler has in mind. We need to run validation 
test scenarios against the statechart assertion.  
In each case the validation test suite resolved the 
ambiguities of the natural language specification. The tests 
were meaningful in that they ensured each assertion were 
distinguishable from each other. The assertions were tested 
and we did find that, when we tested them, we had to 
disambiguate the natural language ourselves to ensure that 
we truly understood what we were describing.  
The two kinds of errors that are commonly found were 
“implementation errors resulting from mistakes in the 
statechart assertion, and errors or ambiguities in the 
natural language statement.” 45 In the first case, the 
statechart behavior does not match the modeler’s intended 
behavior. The second case was more difficult because it 
depended how we as individuals understood the natural 
language statement and how we as individuals clarified the 
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ambiguities. It was by running the test scenarios that we 
were able to identify these errors and modify our 
assumptions and assertions accordingly in order to correct 
the assertions.  
Otani et al.46 revealed that there are some types of 
patterns that must be part of every validation test-suite: 
• Obvious success. We expect that the statechart 
assertion being validated to succeed on such a test.  
• Obvious failure. We expect that the statechart 
assertion being validated to be violated on such a 
test.  
• Event repetitions. We create event repetitions and 
assure that the assertion, if applicable, is  not 
written in a manner that only observes the first 
occurrence of a triggering event P in a  sequence 
of P’s.  
• Multiple time intervals. If the assertion requires 
it, we check that it handles multiple time intervals 
or scenarios. By using this  validation test 
pattern we assure that an  assertion is not written 
in a manner that observes only a single time 
interval.  
• Overlapping time intervals. If the assertion 
requires it, we check that the assertion can handle 
overlapping time intervals within a  scenario. 
Once the types of patterns were clarified we then 
designed our test suite to adhere to the above categories, 
combining them if suitable and ensured that there were an 
appropriate number of tests per test suite that would 
validate the assertion. 
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D. ASSERTION SCENARIOS 
The first assertion statement that we described is: 
Whenever P then Q within T. The assertion statechart (shown 
in Figure 3) was diagramed as follows: 
 
 
Figure 3.   Whenever P then Q within T 
 
Our interpretation of the assertion statement above is: 
if P occurs (timer is reset at every P) then the event Q 
will eventually occur within the time interval. The built in 
event, timeoutFire(), fires after 30 sec. In case of a P 
repetition before a Q the 30 second duration will be 
measured from the first p. We used the following patterns to 
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correctly disambiguate the natural language and ensure that 
the assertion statement accurately reflects the natural 
language as we identified and desired. As described earlier 





P; incrTime(25); Q; incrTime(6)(timeout has occurred). 




Q; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 
this test to be a success because we are testing for 
violations of the assertion and Q by itself does not violate 
the assertion. Our expectation was confirmed. 
Obvious failure:  
 
P; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 
this test to fail because it did not meet the constraints of 
the assertion. Our expectation was confirmed.   
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Overlapping time intervals:  
In this test and the next test we ensure that the 
assertion observes more than the first P in a sequence of 
P’s.   
 
P; incrTime(15); P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26) 
(timeout has occurred). Our goal in this test was to ensure 
that the assertion could handle overlapping time intervals. 
We expected success. Our expectation was confirmed.  
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; P; incrTime(31) (timeout has 
occurred); Q. Our goal in this test was to test overlapping 
time intervals for an expected failure as this test does not 
meet the constraints of the assertion. Our expectation was 
confirmed. 
Multiple Intervals: 
We tested for multiple intervals in this test and the 
next to ensure that the assertion would observe more than a 




P; incrTime(10); Q; incrTime(20); P; incrTime(10); Q; 
incrTime(21) (timeout has occurred). We expected success 
because it meets the requirements of the assertion. We set 
bSuccess = true. Our expectation was confirmed.  
 
P; incrTime(10); Q; incrTime(20); P; incrTime(31) 
(timeout has occurred).  We tested for multiple intervals 
expecting failure because of the constraints of the 
assertion. Our expectation was confirmed.  
The second core assertion statement that we described 
was: Whenever P then no Q within T. The assertion statechart 




Figure 4.   Whenever P then no Q within T 
 
Our interpretation of the assertion is if P, then 
within the time interval for P no Q will appear. The built 
in event, timeoutFire(), fires after 30 sec. A P repetition 
would reset the timer. We used the following patterns to 





P; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 
this test to be a success because no Q occurred which meets 
the requirements of our assertion. Our expectation was 
confirmed.  
 
Q; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 
this test to be a success because we are testing for 
violations of the assertion and Q by itself does not violate 
the assertion. Our expectation was confirmed.  
Obvious failure: 
 
P; incrTime(25); Q; incrTime(6) (timeout has occurred). 
This test was expected to be a failure because it violates 
the requirements of the assertion. Our expectation was 
confirmed.  
Overlapping time intervals: 
In this test and the next test we ensure that the 





P; incrTime(15); P; incrTime (5); Q; incrTime(26) 
(timeout has occurred). Our goal in this test was to ensure 
that the assertion could handle overlapping time intervals. 




P; incrTime(10); P; incrTime(31)(timeout has occurred); 
Q. The test was expected to be a success because Q was not 
injected during the P intervals. Our expectation was 
confirmed. 
Multiple Intervals: 
We tested for multiple intervals in this test to ensure 
that the assertion would observe more than a single time 
interval. 
 
P; incrTime(30); P; incrTime(15); Q; incrTime(16) 
(timeout has occurred). This test was expected to be a 
failure because it does not meet the constraints of the 
assertion. Our expectation was confirmed.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
When we first defined the assertions in natural 
language we discovered that almost all assertions can be 
ambiguous and difficult to define at first. The natural 
language statements meant different things to different 
people.  “If P then Q within T” could mean an interval T 
measured from the first or the last P depending on how it 
was defined and what the software developers wants to test. 
We disambiguated each assertion according to the most 
general and useful definition; this meant that in most cases 
the assertion would be general and not specific so as to be 
more useful. There was additional difficulty as can be 
expected with any new system as StateRover is still in 
development. But we were able to succeed after several 
restarts and debugging help. Finally, during our 
disambiguation period we fell victim to the statechart 
default which is bSuccess = true. During the testing period 
we expected one result and received something completely 
different. This led us to additional testing and 
clarification of the assertions and we had to ensure every 
time that the assertion test was not successful because the 
bSuccess flag was set to true, but rather because the test 
was actually correct.  
This process is incredibly interesting and requires 
clarity of thinking as well as the ability to break down 
natural language. It is not simple but the process invokes 
greater understanding of the validation process and the 
validity of the assertion library. We feel that these 
assertion statements can be built upon and reused for the 
benefit of validation purposes.  
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Additional assertion statecharts and validation test 
suites that we defined and tested can be found in Appendix 
A. A final assertion statechart and validation test suite 
that has merit but is not as valuable as previous mentioned 





A. SUMMARY AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Software has become a vital part of our everyday lives. 
Whether we refer to our military systems, medical systems, 
or our financial systems, software is a part of them and has 
become something that we now depend on. In our thesis we 
concentrate on requirements and their formal specification, 
and we discuss a method to reduce specification errors. We 
strive to find a better technique to answer the question 
“Are we building the right product?” Validation presents a 
means of assuring that software satisfies the user’s 
requirements. It is viewed as a way of saving time and money 
that could otherwise be wasted if a product design is not 
built correctly and rework needs to be conducted. A problem 
that can exist when conducting validation is not conducting 
validation early enough in the design process. Often the 
user’s requirements are reviewed and specifications are 
developed. The product design is then built according to the 
specifications. Once the product design is built validation 
is conducted by comparing the resultant product with the 
original requirements. As software partition of systems 
continues to grow and become more complex we assert that 
validating a product after it is developed is too late in 
the process. At that stage the amount of time and cost of 
rework that may need to be performed is too large. 
Validation needs to begin earlier in the design process by 
ensuring the specifications themselves are correct and 
consistent. 
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At present several ways to conduct validation exist. 
Some guidance that is provided actually describes 
verification when referring to validation by having the 
product design compared to the specifications for the 
project. Others suggest what we have already mentioned and 
that is to check the final product against the user 
requirements. To conduct validation we introduced a process 
of developing and validating temporal formal specifications 
in the form of statechart assertions. Included in our work 
are validation test scenarios intended to ensure 
specifications are in fact correct prior to moving forward 
with a project. The goal is to make available multiple 
libraries of pre-vetted assertions to facilitate validation.  
This research described the attributes of IV&V as well 
as software reuse and explores a concept of combining the 
process of validation and reuse in an attempt to yield a 
repeatable validation technique. Sample requirements were 
identified and then formal specifications in the form of 
statechart assertions were created to capture the 
requirements. Testing scenarios were then developed to 
determine if the statechart assertions were accurate and 
consistent with the original requirements. Once these 
assertions are proven to be accurate they can be stored in a 
library for future reuse. Our intentions are to ensure that 
specifications used to build a product are validated prior 
to time and money going into building the final product. By 
using an assertion repository filled with correct assertions 
to build the specifications for a design, the engineer can 
be sure that the specifications used to build the final 
product are correct. If errors are found in the 
specifications the engineer can go back and find out where 
 51 
the error is coming from. This would be faster and cheaper 
than correcting software that has already been developed in 
accordance with incorrect specifications. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
The goal in both the DoD and the software industry is 
to produce software that is cost effective, reliable, 
maintainable, and above all usable. The current guidance on 
verification and validation that exists does not provide a 
technique to show engineers how to create software that 
possesses these attributes. The guidance that does exist 
leaves software engineers to develop their own verification 
and validation methods. 
The amount of work that could be conducted in the 
software industry to ensure reliable software is being 
produced is abundant. We have established an approach for 
developing and validating statechart assertions as a road 
map to produce reliable software. One avenue of future work 
would be to further expand this approach by developing 
additional assertions that apply to a specific domain. For 
example, select a domain of interest such as theatre 
ballistic missile defense. Then, determine requirements that 
exist within that domain. Once the requirements for the 
specific domain are understood, translate the natural 
language of the requirements into assertions as we did in 
chapter IV. Then validate the assertions through the use of 
test cases to ensure that the statechart assertions 
correctly represent the intended behavior the modeler has in 
mind. 
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Another avenue of future work would be to create a 
library to store the assertions in. When creating the 
library the developer will need to consider the size of the 
library and how many assertions will be placed in it. The 
developer will need to decide if several libraries are to be 
developed to categorize the different assertions or if the 
assertions will be organized within one library in a manner 
that will be easy to search. Once the organization of the 
library is decided information retrieval will need to be 
focused on. How will assertions be retrieved or called from 
the library? What will be the best interface to facilitate 
information retrieval and the use of the assertions? The 
goal should be to find an acceptable interface that does not 
cause errors of its own. Another area to look at is the 
adaptation of the assertions to a library environment. Do 
they perform as expected? One goal the developer should seek 
is to automate the processes of organizing, retrieving 
information from, and interfacing the libraries as much as 
possible in an attempt to reduce errors. 
Finally, once a library is developed, a future project 
could focus on how to best maintain that library to 
facilitate future use. One item to consider is if certain 
assertions are used more frequently than others. In this 
case the developer would want to set up the library in a way 
that the frequently used assertions can be searched before 
the rest of the library is searched. A way to enable this 
would be to maintain a count of how often each assertion is 
used. Also if an assertion is proven not to be used, a way 
to comment the assertion out in the library to eliminate it 
from future searches may prove useful. Doing this may be a 
way to enable faster searches thereby saving time in the 
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development process. By commenting the assertion out rather 
than removing it from the library it can still be included 
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APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL ASSERTION DIAGRAMS AND TEST 
SUITES 
A. ADDITIONAL ASSERTION DIAGRAMS BOUNDED BY TIME 
1. Whenever P Then Less Than N Qs Within T 
 
 
P; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected an 
obvious success. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred).  




P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(21) 
(timeout has occurred). We expected failure since we set N 
to 2. Our expectation was confirmed.  
 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q ; 
incrTime(16)(timeout has occurred). We expected failure 
since we set N to 2. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26)(timeout has occurred); 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5) Q; incrTime(21) (timeout has 
occurred). We tested for multiple intervals in this test to 
ensure that the assertion would observe more than a single 
time interval. We expected failure in the second interval 











P; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected an 
obvious success. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred). 





P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(21) 
(timeout has occurred). We expected an obvious success. Our 
expectation was confirmed. 
  
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q ; 
incrTime(16)(timeout has occurred). We expected obvious 
failure since we set N to 2. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26)(timeout has occurred); 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5) Q; incrTime(5); Q; 
incrTime(16) (timeout has occurred). We tested for multiple 
intervals in this test to ensure that the assertion would 
observe more than a single time interval. We expected 
failure in the second interval since we set N to 2. Our 





3. Whenever P Then Equal to N Qs Within T 
 
 
P; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 
obvious failure since we set N to 2. Our expectation was 
confirmed. 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred). 
We expected obvious failure since we set N to 2. Our 







P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(21) 
(timeout has occurred). We expected obvious success since we 
set N to 2. Our expectation was confirmed.  
 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q ; 
incrTime(16)(timeout has occurred). We expected obvious 
failure since we set N to 2. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(21)(timeout 
has occurred); P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5) Q; 
incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(16) (timeout has occurred). We 
tested for multiple intervals in this test to ensure that 
the assertion would observe more than a single time 











P; increment time to 31; timeout. We expected obvious 
failure since we set N to 2. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred). 




P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(21) 
(timeout has occurred). We expected success since we set N 
to 2. Our expectation was confirmed.  
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q ; 
incrTime(16)(timeout has occurred). We expected success 
since we set N to 2. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5) P; 
incrTime (5); Q; incrTime(26)(timeout has occurred). Our 
goal in this test was to ensure that the assertion could 
handle overlapping time intervals and that the assertion 
observes more than the first P in a sequence of Ps. The test 
was expected to be a failure since we set N to 2 which 
violates the second P. Our expectation was confirmed.  
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(21)(timeout 
has occurred); P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26) (timeout has 
occurred). We tested for multiple intervals in this test to 
ensure that the assertion would observe more than a single 
time interval. We expected failure since we set N to 2.  Our 
expectation was confirmed. 
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P; incrTime(31)(timeout has occurred). We expected 
failure since we set N to 2. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred). 




P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(21) 
(timeout has occurred). We expected failure since we set N 
to 2. Our expectation was confirmed.  
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; 
incrTime(31)(timeout has occurred). We expected success 
since we set N to 2. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5) Q; 
incrTime (5); P; incrTime(10); Q; incrTime(21)(timeout has 
occurred). Our goal in this test was to ensure that the 
assertion could handle overlapping time intervals and that 
the assertion observes more than the first P in a sequence 
of P’s. The test was expected to be a failure since we set N 
to 2. Our expectation was confirmed.  
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P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; 
incrTime(16)(timeout has occurred); P; incrTime(5); Q; 
incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred). We tested for multiple 
intervals in this test to ensure that the assertion would 
observe more than a single time interval. We expected 
failure since we set N to 2. Our expectation was confirmed. 




P; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 
failure. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
Q; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred).  We expected 
success. Our expectation was confirmed.  
 
R; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 
success. Our expectation was confirmed.  
 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred).  
We expected failure. Our expectation was confirmed.  
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P; incrTime(5); R; incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred).  
We expected failure. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); R; incrTime(21)(timeout 
has occurred). We expected success. Our expectation was 
confirmed. 
 
P; incrTime(5); R; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(21)(timeout 
has occurred). We expected success. Our expectation was 
confirmed. 
 
P; incrTime(5);P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime (5); R; 
incrTime(26)(timeout has occurred). Our goal in this test 
and the next was to ensure that the assertion could handle 
overlapping time intervals and that the assertion observes 
more than the first P in a sequence of Ps. The test was 




P; incrTime(5);Q; incrTime(10) P; incrTime (5); R; 
incrTime(26)(timeout has occurred). The test was expected to 
be a failure. Our expectation was confirmed.  
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); R; incrTime(21)(timeout 
has occurred); P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26) (timeout has 
occurred). We expected failure. Our expectation was 
confirmed.  
In this assertion statement we did not differentiate 
between Q or R coming first, our intention was to ensure 
that the combination of both Q and R regardless of order 
resulted in a successful test.  
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7. Whenever P Then Q or R Within T 
 
 
P; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 
failure. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
Q; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 





R; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 
success. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred).  
We expected success. Our expectation was confirmed.  
 
P; incrTime(5); R; incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred). 
We expected success. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); R; incrTime(21)(timeout 




P; incrTime(5); R; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(21)(timeout 




P; incrTime(5);Q; incrTime(15); P; incrTime(5); R; 
incrTime(26)(timeout has occurred). Our goal in this test 
and the next was to ensure that the assertion could handle 
overlapping time intervals and that the assertion observes 
more than the first P in a sequence of P’s. The test was 
expected to be a success. Our expectation was confirmed.  
 
P; incrTime(5);Q; incrTime(10) P; incrTime(31) (timeout 
has occurred); R. The test was expected to be a success.  





P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(31)(timeout has occurred); 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); R; incrTime(21) (timeout has 
occurred). We tested for multiple intervals in this test and 
the next to ensure that the assertion would observe more 
than a single time interval. We expected success. Our 
expectation was confirmed. 
8. Whenever P Then Q or Rot R Within T 
 
 
P; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 




Q; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred).  We expected 
success. Our expectation was confirmed.  
 
R; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 
success. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred). 
We expected success. Our expectation was confirmed.  
 
P; incrTime(5); R; incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred). 




P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); R; incrTime(21)(timeout 




P; incrTime(15);P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26)(timeout 
has occurred); R.  Our goal in this test and the next was to 
ensure that the assertion could handle overlapping time 
intervals and that the assertion observes more than the 
first P in a sequence of P’s. The test was expected to be a 
success. Our expectation was confirmed.  
 
P; incrTime(5);Q; incrTime(10) P; incrTime(21); R; 
incrTime(10) (timeout has occurred). The test was expected 




P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred); 
P; incrTime(5); R; incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred). We 
tested for multiple intervals in this test to ensure that 
the assertion would observe more than a single time 
interval. We expected failure. Our expectation was 
confirmed.  





P; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 
obvious failure. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
 
Q; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 
success. Our expectation was confirmed.  
 
R; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 
success. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred). 




P; incrTime(5); R; incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred). 
We expected failure. Our expectation was confirmed.   
 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); R; incrTime(21)(timeout 
has occurred). We expected failure. Our expectation was 
confirmed. 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(21) 




P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); P; 
incrTime(20); Q; incrTime(15) (timeout has occurred). Our 
goal in this test was to ensure that the assertion could 
handle overlapping time intervals and that the assertion 
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observes more than the first P in a sequence of P’s. The 




P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(21) 
(timeout has occurred); P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26) 
(timeout has occurred). We tested for multiple intervals in 
this test to ensure that the assertion would observe more 
than a single time interval. We expected success. Our 
expectation was confirmed.  
B. ADDITIONAL ASSERTION DIAGRAMS UNBOUNDED BY TIME 
We felt that this assertion statement should be 
separated from the other assertion statements because the 
time is unbounded. It still has merit as an assertion 
statement but may not be as useful as the other assertions.  
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1. Whenever P Then Not Q After T 
 
 
P; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 
obvious success. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
Q; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred). We expected 
success. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26) (timeout has occurred). 




P; incrTime(31) (timeout has occurred); Q . We expected 
failure. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 
 
P; incrTime(10); P; incrTime(10); Q; 
incrTime(21)(timeout has occurred). Our goal in this test 
was to ensure that the assertion could handle overlapping 
time intervals and that the assertion observes more than the 
first P in a sequence of Ps. We expected success. Our 
expectation was confirmed.  
 
P; incrTime(5); P; incrTime(31)(timeout has occurred); 
Q. We expected failure. Our expectation was confirmed. 
 81 
 
P; incrTime(5); Q; incrTime(26)(timeout has occurred); 
P; incrTime(31)(timeout has occurred); Q. We tested for 
multiple intervals in this test to ensure that the assertion 
would observe more than a single time interval.  We expected 
failure. Our expectation was confirmed. 
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